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1 Introduction
Mood a¤ects choice. This relationship has been analysed extensively in psychology.1 For
example, mood has been shown to modulate variety seeking in consumer goods (Kahn
and Isen [17]), aversion or propensity to risk taking (Williams and Voon [47]), dietary and
exercise habits (Thayer [45], [46]). Positive or negative emotional reactions to economic
conditions are demonstrated to strongly a¤ect partisanship in elections (e.g. Clarke,
Sanders, and Whiteley [9]). Good mood was found to increase altruistic behavior in the
dictator game (Capra [8]). The marketing literature on this topic is equally extensive, its
broad focus being on how di¤erent moods and a¤ective states condition product choice.2
The Oxford Dictionary of the English Language denes mood as a temporary state of
mind or feeling. So moodas a notion subsumes its various incarnations of e.g. anxiety,
savouring, dread.3 Although there are many papers in the economics literature that deal
with specic manifestations of mood and their e¤ect on choice,4 as far as we are aware
there has been no attempt to model mood in a general and systematic way, independently
of its various realizations.5
In this paper we formalise a notion of mood and we study how mood may a¤ect an
agents choice. We present a model in which choice, even though subject to mood swings,
need not be unpredictable. Even moody behaviour presents some systematic patterns,
which can be identied by means of direct observable choice data. We assume throughout
that the mood itself in which a choice is made is not necessarily observable: only the
resulting choice is.
1A sample of publications is: Erber, Wang and Poe[12], Isen [16], Kahn and Isen [17], Mayer, Gaschke,
Braverman and Evans [26], Mittal and Ross [35], Nygren [36], Nygren, Isen, Tayor and Dulin [37], Williams
and Voon [47].
2See e.g. Groenland and Schoormans [15], Lewinson and Mano [23] or Qiu and Yeung [39]
3A terminological note. Mood is related to emotion, but even among psychologists the exact
distinction between the two concepts is not consensual, see e.g. Beedie, Terry and Lane [5]. Mood and
emotion are both instances of a¤ect, with mood tendentially interpreted as a more di¤use, prolonged
and uncaused a¤ect than emotion. As in this paper we remain vague on issues of permanence, stability
and cause, we might have used the generic term a¤ectinstead of mood. We have chosen the latter term
because it is more recognisable and less awkward outside the eld of psychology: a¤ectis a term that
tends not to be used in everyday language to describe human experience and one that was not mentioned
once by any of the 106 respondents in the present study. ([5]).
4From Loomes and Sugdens regret theory [24], to Caplin and Leahys psychological expected utility
[7], and Köszegis personal equilibrium [20] just to cite a few. See also the references in the recent survey
by Rick and Loewenstein [40].
5The only exception is possibly the theory of psychological games introduced by Geanakoplos, Pearce
and Stacchetti [13] and further developed by Battigalli and Duwfenberg [4]. There, though, psychological
states are induced buy the road not takenin the context of a game. Here we backtrack one step, and
focus on a single decision maker confronted with choices over alternatives, rather than strategies.
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We posit that any general model of mood must identify a xed component, invariant
to mood; and a variable component, a¤ected by the current psychological state. Our cen-
tral modelling idea is that mood a¤ects choice by controlling the urgency of the attributes
sought in the available alternatives by the decision maker. A mood (such as loneliness)
that induces a craving for sweet food, for example, is expressed operationallyin state-
ments such as today I could do with some chocolate. In our model such a statement is
translated (roughly) as today sweetness is an important attribute of what Im going to
eat.
The attribute varietywas more sought after, in an experiment (Kahn and Isen [17]),
when a positive mood was induced by the experimenter: in our model this is represented
by pushing varietyhigher in the attribute urgency ranking. Similarly, a depressed mood,
which is known to sometimes provoke overeating as a coping strategy (Thayer [46]), pushes
down the attribute healthinesswhen selecting a meal, and pushes up the attribute high
sugar/fat content. A less obvious example is that of a negotiator in an aggressive mood,
who raises the bar to consider an o¤er acceptable: this can be modelled in our framework
by pushing to the top all the deal-breakingattributes which are sought in an o¤er. As
a nal example, one might argue that irrational exuberanceamong nancial operators
(a memorable example of collective mood), consists at least in part of focussing more on
the speculative prospects of large gains rather than on the danger of losses.
We distinguish between mood and mindset. We call mindsetthe set of attributes
(or properties) which are considered by an agent when making a choice, the things that
make an agent tick. A glutton would have to change his mindset/personality, not just
his mood, to start paying attention to the fat content of his diet, and a foolhardy agent
will ignore, in any mood, the safety features of his choices.
While the set of attributes that constitutes a mindset is xed throughout all choices,
how these attributes are ranked with respect to one another, i.e. the agents mood, can
vary across di¤erent choice problems: soothingmight be an attribute that the decision
maker generally considers (i.e. it is part of his mindset), that it is pushed down in
importance in a buoyant mood, when it is considered as a relatively minor attribute; but
that becomes the most important attribute when in a dejected mood. This allows an
agent that has a xed set of values to make di¤erent choices under di¤erent moods: if
a mood reorders the priority that each attribute possesses, then it is conceivable that
one alternative that possesses the attribute that is top in a mood might be selected if
available in that mood, but discarded when available under a mood that privileges a
di¤erent attribute that this alternative does not possess.
So how are moods determined? We pursue two alternative modeling strategies, that
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capture two distinct ways in which, we argue, mood may a¤ect choice. The following
examples illustrate.
Example 1 (Menu induced mood I) A wine consumer has a mindset comprising the
attributes {within a Tight budget}, {within a Loose budget} and {with an Acceptable
taste}, that is T , L and A, respectively. In a coolmood, his top priority is to stick
to a tight budget, so that he would rst consider wines within the tight budget. However
when in a hotmood meeting the taste threshold becomes paramount, and the ranking of
the attributes puts A on top, followed by L and T . Suppose that the hotmood is triggered
by the presence of a very expensive and top-of-the-range wine z, while otherwise he is in
a coolmood. Then we would observe this consumer buying a mid ranging wine x that
meets the tight budget rather than a better and more expensive wine y that does not; while
we would observe our consumer buying y, which passes the acceptability threshold, and
discard x, which does not.
Example 2 (Menu induced mood II)6 A child has a mindset comprising {naughty
food} and {mums choice}. In a neutral mood he would put naughtiness on top, but in a
docile mood he would put mums choice rst. Suppose that the docile mood is triggered by
the presence of fruit juice. Then in a menu including fruit juice he picks more fruit and
vegetables items, that mum would be happy with, than if we remove fruit juice from the
same menu.
Example 3 (Environment induced mood I)7 A decision maker is recovering from
surgery in hospital. His mindset comprises the two attributes {low chemical stu¤ in my
body} and {being stoned}. After being shown a humorous movie, {low chemical stu¤ in
my body} is the most important attribute; while {being stoned} is top after being shown an
action movie. So in the rst situation, when he is in a good mood, he only asks for a low
dose of pain killer (which satises the property of inserting limited amounts of chemical
in the body), while after watching the action movie, when he is in a neutral mood, he asks
for a higher dose of painkiller.
6This example is based on the eld evidence in Obadia et al [38], who study ordering patterns in
paediatric hospital patients. The children ordered a mean of 5 servings of fruits and vegetables/day,
which decreased to 3.5 servings when juice was removed.
7This example is based on the evidence in Rotton and Shats [41]: in a carefully designed eld experi-
ment conducted with 78 orthopedic patients recovering from surgery, they nd that humor (i.e. exposure
to humorous movies as opposed to action ones) reduced requests for minor medication. Interestingly,
for those patients who had been unable to choose which humorous movie to watch out of a given list
increased use of heavy analgesic.
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Example 4 (Environment induced mood II)8 A decision makers mindset comprises
the two attributes {large upside} and {acceptable downside}, and assume that this decision
maker considers large any monetary amount above $30, and acceptable any monetary
amount above $5. When choosing between a low risk lottery l = ($16; 0:7; $20; 0:3) of-
fering $16 with probability 0:7 and $20 with the complementary probability; and the high
risk lottery h = ($1; 0:7; $38:5; 0:3) o¤ering $1 and $38.50 with probabilities 0.7 and 0.3,
respectively. When in an angry mood, {large upside} becomes the prominent attribute,
while in a fearful mood {acceptable downside} is the most prominent attribute. So when
angry he picks h over l, since h has the attribute large upside that l does not possess;
while when fearful he picks l over h, since l has an acceptable downside, which is now
the most important attribute, while h does not.
In the rst two examples, mood is triggered by the choice set under consideration. In
the last two examples, mood is determined by factors exogenous to the choice problem (the
environment), and the agent is observed making choices from the same set in di¤erent
moods. Yet, in most cases outside controlled experiments, we cannot observe the moods
of an agent making a choice.9 In this paper we provide a framework to capture both types
of situations, and characterise each of the two alternative scenarios with restrictions on
choice behaviour that we can test with (observable) choice data.
The model in which mood is menu-induced is, as expected, more permissive. It is fully
characterised by a new choice axiom that is intermediate in strength between two well-
known standard consistency properties: it is weaker than the Weak Axiom of Revealed
Preference (WARP) and stronger than Sens property . Concretely, the axiom implies
that a moody agent will always express coherent behavioural indi¤erences: if he reveals
himself willing to engage in a sequence of trades, say leading from x to y, then he will
also be willing to engage in a direct trade between x and y. So in particular a welfare
planner can still use, like with a standard agent, behavioral indi¤erences as a guidance
(he cannot, however, use in the same way the agents strict revealed preferences).
The second model, where mood is environmental, admits multiple observations of
choice from the same feasible set (in di¤erent moods). We show that the set of possible
8This example is based on the evidence in Kugler, Ordóñez and Connolly [21], who nd that inducing
moods of fearfulness results in the tendency to choose less risky lotteries as compared to the case when
anger is the induced mood in an experiment with real monetary payments.
9In experimental situations several standard psychological devices are used to trigger a mood. A
positive mood, for instance, may be triggered by a gift of candy-bars prior to the agent performing the
task. The triggering of moods in real-life situations is a more complex phenomenon, which we do not
analyse in this paper. We do not take a position on whether such devices really trigger the asserted
mood. Our arguments only presuppose that the agent is observed to make choices from the same set in
di¤erent moods (whatever they are).
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choice observations (in all possible moods) fails to satisfy Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives and other consistency properties, but still again is characterized by a property
which is intermediate between two standard consistency properties: it is weaker than
WARP and stronger than Property . If x is always rejected (in any mood) from a set
A, then it is always rejected from any other set which contains all the alternatives chosen
(in some mood) from A.
As we shall see, this in turn implies that, to an external observer, the choices of
a moody agent appear as if the agent was maximising a utility function but committed
occasionalmistakes (picking alternatives that do not maximize utility). The error pattern,
however, will satisfy the constraint that any alternative chosen by mistake in a large set
can also be chosen by mistake in a smaller set. This is in agreement with some leading
models of choice with error.
2 Mindset and mood
Fix a nonempty set of alternatives X. Given a set  of nonempty subsets of X, a choice
function on  is a map c that associates with each A 2  (a feasible set) a nonempty set
c(A)  A (the agents selection from A).
To build a model of moody choice, we assume, as in Mandler, Manzini and Mariotti
[27] (MMM), that the agent makes choices by sequentially going through a checklist of
propertiesof alternatives (properties are meant as synonymous with attributes). At
each step, he discards the alternatives that do not possess the relevant property. In spite
of being procedural, that decision model is shown in MMM to be essentially equivalent to
ordinary preference maximisation: an agent has a checklist if and only if he maximises a
preference relation. Any checklist corresponds with a preference, and viceversa. However
the checklist model has richer primitives than ordinary preference maximisation. It is
this feature that permits to distinguish, unlike with a preference, between the more stable
traits of the agents personality (mindset), and the more variable aspects (mood).
We identify a property with the set of alternatives that possess that property. So
formally a property is simply a subset P  X, and we say that x has property P whenever
x 2 P . E.g. the property sweetconsists of all the objects in X which are sweet.
A mindset    2Xn? is a set of mutually distinct properties.
Given a mindset  , a mood is a well-order < of  .10
10A well-order < on a set Y is a a linear order (complete, transitive and antisymmetric relation) with
the property that any subset of Y has a <-least element.
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So, a mindset expresses which properties are important for the agent, while a mood
determines how important (in a relative sense) each property is.
3 The mood is determined by the menu
We rst examine a model in which the mood depends on the choice set. Multiple choices
from a choice set are allowed, and they are interpreted as being made always in the same
mood (the one triggered by the choice set itself). Given a mindset   and a set A 2 , a
mood for A is a well-order <A of  .
A variable checklist is a pair
 
 ; f<AgA2

of a mindset and a collection of moods,
one for each choice set.
Given A 2  and a variable checklist   ; f<AgA2, dene inductively:
For all P 2   : SA (P;<A) =
\
Q<AP
SA (Q;<A) \ P
That is, when facing the choice set A, the agents mood for that set identies the order of
the properties in the checklist. The agent scans the checklist, and when considering each
property he only retains the alternatives which have that property, if any. Otherwise he
retains all the alternatives that have survived until that stage. Then the agent moves to
next stage.
When convenient we omit denoting the well order in the sets SA (P;<A) and simply
write SA (P ).
Denition 1 A choice function c on  has a variable checklist if there exists a variable
checklist
 
 ; f<AgA2

such that for all A 2 , for some property P 2  ,
SA(P ) = SA(Q) for all Q 2   with P <A Q
c(A) = SA(P ) (1)
In words, a choice function has a variable checklist in only and all those alternatives
that are chosen from a set are in the lastsurvival set constructed on the basis of the
relevant mood. As we said already, here it is potentially possible that each set triggers a
di¤erent mood, i.e. a di¤erent order in which the various properties are considered. To
the contrary, MMM consider checklists that are independent of the choice set:
Denition 2 A choice function c on  has a checklist if it has a variable checklist 
 ; f<AgA2

with <A=<B for any A;B 2 .
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A choice function c having a checklist expresses the classical notion of rationality in
economics, preference maximisation. A choice function c maximises a preference if there
exists a weak order11 % on X such that, for all A 2 , c (A) = fx : x % y for all y 2 Ag
Theorem 1 (MMM): A choice function c on  has a checklist if and only if it maximises
a preference.
A choice function may have a variable checklist even when it has no checklist:
Example 5 A consumer enters an exuberantmood when he faces large menus or menus
composed entirely of luxury items, but is in a thrifty mood when a thrifty item is available
in a small menu. So he will for instance choose an expensive food item in a hefty restaurant
list, and a modest entree in a shorter one. Formally, let X = fx; y; zg and let  = 2Xn?,
where x and y are luxury, z is thrifty, and only the grand set is large. So
c (X) = c (fx; yg) = fx; yg
c (fx; zg) = c (fy; zg) = fzg
The choice function c cannot maximise any weak order (c (X) = fx; yg would imply
x % z while c (fx; zg) = fzg would imply z  x) and therefore by the previous theorem
it cannot have a checklist. Nevertheless it has the variable checklist (ffx; yg ; fzgg ; <A)
with the mood fx; yg <A fzg for A 2 fX; fx; ygg and the mood fzg <A fx; yg for A 2
ffx; zg ; fy; zgg.
3.1 A moody agent does not necessarily make moody choices
Mood is not necessarily expressed in observable choice behaviour. In particular, mood
is important only when the properties cannot be ranked as more or less permissive, i.e.
when they are not nested.
Example 6 Suppose that we observe
c (fx; y; zg) = c (fx; yg) = c (fy; zg) = y
c (fx; zg) = z
11A weak order is a a complete transitive relation.
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We could infer that the mindset is ffyg ; fy; zgg with mood fyg <A fy; zg for all A, but
we could equally well apply the opposite mood fy; zg <A fyg and still retrieve the same
choice data.
Formally, say that a variable checklist
 
 ; f<AgA2

is nested if for all P;Q 2   we
have either P  Q or Q  P .
When the checklist is nested, the agents mood (given the mindset) does not a¤ect
choice: a moody agent behaves exactly like a non-moody agent.
Proposition 1 Let c be a choice function with a nested variable checklist. Then c max-
imises a weak order % on X.
Proof. We show the following: let c and d be two choice functions on  that have,
respectively the variable checklists
 
 ; f<AgA2

and
 
 ; f<0AgA2

; then c = d.
Suppose that c (A) 6= d (A) for some A 2  and in particular let (possibly relabeling
the choice functions) x 2 c (A) and x =2 d (A). The latter implies that there exist y 2 A
and P 2   such that x =2 P and y 2 P . For x 2 c (A) it must then be the case that there
exists Q <A P and z 2 A such that y =2 Q and z 2 Q. If P  Q this is incompatible
with y 2 P , and if Q  P then x =2 Q. Therefore x =2 SA(Q;<A) and x =2 c (A), a
contradiction.
So any sequence of the properties generates the same behaviour and by theorem 1 the
behaviour generated by any particular sequence maximises a weak order, as claimed.
A leading example of nested properties is provided by a textbook utility maximiser
who uses as properties the upper contour sets of the utility function. This case has a
natural procedural interpretation: the agent is in fact a satiscer who at each stage t sets
a threshold numerical satisfaction target st. At stage t, the agent keeps only the satiscing
alternatives (those that meet the target st), if any, and otherwise he keeps all of them.
In the next stage he revises the satisfaction threshold. There is no need to specify the
revision rule, precisely because the properties are nested. The maximal alternatives (in
terms of the numerical measure) in a set will never be eliminated: if when considering
a property P the set of survivors from the previous stages contains some alternatives
that are in P , then the maximal alternatives must be among them. The mood, in this
interpretation, manifests itself in the initial property s1 and the revision rule adopted:
sometimes (e.g. when he is in an impatient mood) the agent will start with ambitious
targets, and sometimes with more modest ones; sometimes he will react to the lack of
satisfactory alternatives by radically revising down the target, and sometimes he will hold
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rm. This agent is moody as well as procedural but his choice behaviour never appears
to be swayed by his mood.
The fact that the agent changes choice after mood alteration may be used as a test to
select between alternative possible mindsets that could all explain a given initial choice.
In the previous example, we could have also inferred the mindset ffx; yg ; fy; zgg using
the the mood fy; zg <A fx; yg for all A. But with this mindset the mood is important:
the mood fx; yg <A fy; zg for all A would have generated the choice c (fx; zg) = x instead
of c (fx; zg) = z. If we observed such a change in choice, we would know that the mindset
cannot be nested.
3.2 The observable behavioural implications of menu-induced
moody choice
Even when behaviour is moody, it needs not be completely unstructured: by using a
revealed preference type of property, we can reject the hypothesis that the decision
maker is acting on the basis of mood by observing certain patterns of choice:
Example 7 Let X = fw; x; y; zg and  = ffx; y; zg ; fw; xgg. Suppose
c (fx; y; zg) = fx; y; zg
c (fw; x; yg) = fxg
The choice from fw; x; yg implies that, if there existed a variable checklist, then its mindset
would contain a property P which separatesx and y, i.e. x 2 P and y =2 P . But then,
whatever the mood at X, such a property would sooner or later also separate x and y in
fx; y; zg, contradicting x; y 2 c (fx; y; zg).
The reasoning in the above example suggests a necessary property:
Togetherness: If x; y 2 c (A) and y 2 c (B) then not (x 2 Bnc (B)).
Note that this property is intermediate in strength between two classical revealed pref-
erence properties: the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP) and Sens property
. These are dened as follows:
WARP: If x 2 c (A), y 2 A and y 2 c (B) then not (x 2 Bnc (B)).
Property : If x; y 2 c (A), A  B and y 2 c (B) then not (x 2 Bnc (B)).
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These axioms share the same conclusion as Togetherness, but Togetherness reaches it
from a weaker (resp. stronger) premise than Property  (resp. WARP). It turns out that
the property is also su¢ cient to characterise the model.
Proposition 2 A choice function c has a variable checklist if and only if it satises
Togetherness.
Proof. Suppose c satises Togetherness. Let the mindset be   = fc (A) : A 2 g. For
each A 2 , let the mood <A be any well-order for which c (A) <A P for all P 2  .
So for any x 2 Anc (A), x =2 SA (c (A) ; <A). And for any P 2  n fc (A)g, there are no
x; y 2 c (A) such that x 2 P and y =2 P , for that would mean x 2 c (B) and y =2 c (B) for
some B 2 , contradicting Togetherness. So f ; <Ag is a variable checklist for c.
Conversely, let

 ; f<AgA2
	
be a variable checklist for c. Suppose x; y 2 c (A)
for some A 2 , and suppose by contradiction that, for some B 2 , y 2 c (B) and
x 2 Bnc (B). Then there exists P 2   such that y 2 P and x =2 P . By denition of
having a checklist there exists Q 2   such that SA (Q) = SA (R) for all R 2   with
Q <A R. This cannot be true if Q <A P . On the other hand, if P <A Q it cannot be
x; y 2 c (A), a contradiction.
This result claries the sense in which our model yields testable conditions that apply
even to moody behaviour: an agent, no matter how moody, will never be observed to
accept two alternatives from one set while rejecting only one of the two from another set.
Write x  y (behavioural indi¤erence) if there is no A 2  such that x 2 c (A)
and y 2 Anc (A) or y 2 c (A) and x 2 Anc (A) (x and y are never separated by choice).
The relation  is obviously symmetric. If Togetherness holds and we make the further
assumption that c is dened on all nite subsets of X, then  is also transitive: if x 
y  z but (say) x 2 c (A) and z 2 Anc (A), then c (fx; y; zg) cannot be dened without
contradicting Togetherness (without the domain assumption, x  y could result simply
from the lack of observations of choices from sets where x and y are both present).  is
therefore an equivalence relation and it partitions the set of alternatives into equivalence
classes, which can be interpreted as behavioural indi¤erence classes.
A moody agent satises the transitivity of the behavioural indi¤erence . So in
particular he is willing to carry out in one step a trade, such as between x and y, when
he has implicitly (via ) revealed his willingness to carry out a sequence of pairwise
trades leading from x to y. Moreover he will be willing to carry out explicitly the implicit
sequence of trades in any order. This is because the implicit trades which are acceptable
11
to a moody agent are all and only the trades between alternatives that have exactly the
same properties, and having the same propertiesis a symmetric and transitive relation.
These observations are relevant for welfare analysis. Like in the standard case, a
planner, faced with the task of choosing between implementing x or y, may let himself be
guided by the sequences of behavioural indi¤erences of a possibly moody agent without
fear of hurting the agents welfare (namely, without strictly contradicting the pairwise
choice the agent himself would make between x and y). The di¤erence with standard
welfare analysis is that the planner can no longer use the behavioural strict preferences
in the usual way to welfare judgements as a guide if he suspects that the agent is moody.
Nevertheless, a case for strict welfare judgements can still be made, as we explain below.
We observe that there is a di¤erent way to express Togetherness which sheds further
light on the behavioural restrictions it implies:
All or Nothing: For all A;B 2 : If c (A) \ c (B) 6= ?, then c (A) \ c (B) = c (A) \B.
All or Nothing demands that when moving from a choice set A to another choice set
B, either the agents choice changes completely (no alternative is chosen from both sets)
or it is inertial, in the sense that whatever was originally chosen in A and is still available
in B, it remains chosen, and no new alternatives are added to the choice.
Proposition 3 A choice function satises Togetherness if and only if it satises All or
Nothing.
Proof. Suppose that Togetherness holds and that c (A) \ c (B) 6= ?. Obviously for
any x 2 c (A) \ c (B) we have x 2 c (A) \ B, that is c (A) \ c (B)  c (A) \ B. For
the converse inclusion, for any x 2 c (A) \ B either c (A) \ c (B) = fxg or there exists
y 6= x with y 2 c (A) \ c (B) and so by Togetherness x 2 c (B). This shows that
c (A) \B  c (A) \ c (B) and we conclude that c (A) \ c (B) = c (A) \B.
Conversely, suppose that Togetherness is violated, that is there exist A;B 2  and
x; y 2 c (A), with x 2 c (B), y 2 B but y =2 c (B). Then c (A) \ c (B) 6= ?. Moreover,
y =2 c (A) \ c (B) while y 2 c (A) \ B, so that c (A) \ c (B) 6= c (A) \ B, violating All or
Nothing.
Contrast again the restriction imposed by All or Nothing with that imposed byWARP,
which can be written as A \ c (B) 6= ?) c (A) \ c (B) = c (A) \B (the same conclusion
of All or Nothing from a weaker premise). Suppose I express a willingness to go to the
theatre or to the cinema when the only other alternatives are to work or to keep the
appointment with the dentist, but choose to keep the appointment with the dentist when
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the other alternatives are cinema, theatre, work, and a visit to a friend in the hospital. In
this example we have a violation of WARP but not of All or Nothing: the switch from the
choice of cinema or theatre to the choice of seeing the dentist can be imputed to a shift
in mood. It could be, for instance, that the presence of a friend in the hospital, while not
providing me with a su¢ ciently strong reason to visit her, puts me in a pensive mood,
focussing my mind away from entertainment choices.
With a view to welfare analysis, choices as in the example above provide us with
some information about preferences: they tell us that, under both observed moods,
work is never chosen, whereas all other three alternatives which are available in di¤erent
moods (and we know that the mood must have changed across sets since WARP has been
violated) are chosen under at least one mood. We deduce that, whatever the hierarchy of
importance among the properties sought in the alternatives, work never o¤ers a crucial
property that some other alternative does not o¤er, and there are crucial properties that
other alternatives o¤er but work does not. Work appears thus a good candidate to be
declared welfare inferior to the other three alternatives available in both moods. We
cannot make the same inference regarding visiting a friend in the hospital, since such a
choice was not available in the rst mood. This type of reasoning o¤ers a concrete model
that supports Bernheim and Rangels [6] approach to behavioural welfare economics:
their proposed welfare criterion would lead to same conclusion regarding the choice of
work.12
3.3 Comparison with multiself models
Our procedure posits that the decision maker is able in principle to go down the complete
list of properties in the variable checklist, which can be very long. However, note that in
the checklists constructed in the proof, he stops at the rst property. The multiplicity
of properties in the proof serves only to activate, in the mind of the agent, di¤erent
properties in di¤erent choice sets, and not to successively rene the selection within a
given choice set. This is reminiscent of the model by Kalai, Rubinstein and Spiegler
[18] (KRS), who assume that the decision maker maximises a preference relation (a weak
order) which depends on the choice set. Indeed it may appear at rst sight that the two
12As weve argued more extensively elsewhere (Manzini and Mariotti [30]), the test for the validity of
Bernheim and Rangels [6] proposed association between choices and welfare rankings should be consti-
tuted by the most plausible psychological model(s) that generates the observed choices. Beside our own
([30]), other works suggest plausile models in which there is sometimes a discrepancy between Bernheim
and Rangels prescription and true welfare: see e.g. Masatlioglu, Nakajima and Ozbay [31] and Ru-
binstein and Salant [42]. This line of argument presupposes that the most plausible model(s)can be
identied, which is exactly what Bernheim and Rangel reject.
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models are equivalent: using a variable checklist means using a checklist that varies with
A and therefore, in view of theorem 1, maximising a weak order that depends on A.
But a moments reection shows that the two models are in fact distinct: after all,
while or model is characterised by Togetherness, the KRS model can explain any choice
observation.13 Since for any choice set A we can simply pick a preference with c (A) \ A
in the highest indi¤erence class (KRS work with nite sets), it may happen that x A y
and y B x for the preferences %A and %B applied to two sets A and B, respectively.
Therefore it may happen that fxg = c (A), y 2 A and x; y 2 c (B), violating Togetherness.
This highlights the centrality in our model of the xed nature of the mindset. The fact
that departures from rationalityin choice can only be attributed to the mood, and not
to the mindset, imposes, unlike the KRS model, some discipline on behaviour. In the
KRS model behaviour is determined by variable preferences, and there is no restriction
on the variability of preferences.
Similar observations hold for the recent works by Green and Hojman [14] and Ambrus
and Rozen [2]. Green and Hojman model an agent as a probability distribution over all
possible ordinal preference ordering. Such preferences are then aggregated via a voting
rule. If the voting rule satises a certain monotonicity property, this model can also
explain any choice behavior. Ambrus and Rozen study a very general model of a decision
maker as a collection of utility functions (selves), which encompasses many other models
in this vein. Each choice set may activate a di¤erent aggregation procedure of the various
selves. This aggregation procedure is constrained to satisfy some natural axioms, which
however force the aggregation rule to incorporate some cardinal information: this contrasts
with our and the other models mentioned in this section, which are purely ordinal.
The central result by Ambrus and Rozen is that with a su¢ cient number of selves any
choice observation can be explained, in spite of the restrictions imposed on the aggregation
procedure. This work leads to the conclusion that multiselves models need, in order to
exhibit observable restrictions, limit the number of allowable selves. Replacing selves
with moods, this intuition could also be made to apply to our framework. Restricting the
set of allowable moods would produce tighter implications for observable choice behaviour.
Because our analysis species the components of a mood, one obvious way to restrict a
mood is to restrict the number of properties that constitute it (some environments may
specify natural restrictions). We also have noted above how the restriction of nestedness
of the mood makes our model equivalent to utility maximisation.
13To be precise, KRS deal with choice functions. We are referring to the obvious extension of their
ideas to choice correspondences.
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4 The mood is determined by the environment
We now consider a di¤erent model, in which multiple choices from a choice set can be
made under di¤erent moods.14
A mindset is dened exactly as before, as a set of properties  , and a mood is simply
a well-order <m of  . The mood now does not depend on the feasible set, but instead we
allow several observations of choice from an A, each time in a di¤erent (unidentiable)
mood. We allow for the possibility that each observation is itself multivalued.
Specically, letM be the set of moods, in which any set A is considered. Let c (A;<m)
denote the choice fromA in mood<m2M . Analogously to before, c (A;<m) is determined
by a sequence of successive eliminations. The survivor sets are dened by
For all P 2   : SA (P;<m) =
\
Q<AP
SA (Q;<m) \ P
For all A 2 , for some property P 2  :
SA(P; < m) = SA(Q;<m) for all Q 2   with P <m Q
c(A; < m) = SA(P;<m) (2)
We begin by noting that the choice functions c (:; <m), which describe the observations
conditional on one mood, satisfy (Arrows) IIA:
IIA: A  B, c (B) \ A 6= ; ) c (A) = c (B) \ A.
IIA says that all the alternatives chosen in a large set must still be chosen when
available in a smaller set.
Proposition 4 For all <m2M , c (:; <m) satises IIA.
Proof: If x 2 c (B;<m) then xmust be in any SB(P;<m), and therefore in any SA(P;<m),
so that x 2 c (A;<m) whenever x 2 A: so c (B;<m) \ A  c (A). And if x =2 c (B;<m)
and c (B;<m) \ A 6= ;, then there exists y 2 c (B;<m) \ A that has a property which x
does not have. So there is P for which x =2 SA(P;<m), and consequently x =2 c (B;<m).
This shows that c (A)  c (B;<m) \ A, and we conclude that c (A)  c (B;<m) \ A.
Unfortunately, proposition 4 is often not of practical use: although each c (:; <m)
satises IIA, the specic mood under which choice was made is most likely unobservable:
14As in the previous section, our setup is static. Laibson [22] studies a dynamic model of what we
would call an environmental moodtriggered by binary cues.
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it seems plausible to expect an external observer to have only choice data, not mood data,
at his disposal. In the next section we explore the testable conditions that observed choice
produced under the inuence of environmental mood do and do not meet.
4.1 Environmental mood causes behaviour inconsistency
Dene a choice correspondence C by
C (A) =
[
<m2M
c (A;<m) for all A 2 
This is related to the methodology of Salant and Rubinsteins [43] choice with frames,
where a choice correspondence is interpreted as including, for each A, all the single-valued
choices made from A in some frame. The denition here is similar (replacing framewith
mood), but we allow the starting choice c (A;<m) to be multi-valued.15
We search for standard consistencyproperties that C may satisfy. First of all, it is
easy to show that C does not inherit IIA from the c. Alternatives which are not chosen,
in any mood, from a large set, may be chosen, in some mood, from a smaller set in which
they are available.
We illustrate this with an example which shows, more in particular, that C fails to
satisfy two classical basic consistency properties. One is Property  already dened, and
the other is:
Expansion: If A;B;A [B 2 , then C (A) \ C (B)  C (A [B).
Expansion16 says that an alternative chosen from two feasible sets must still be chosen
when the two sets are merged.
Suppose there are three properties you look at when selecting from a restaurant menu:
recommended by a friend, cheapness, and perceived appeal. In a trusting moodyou sift
through the properties in this order: a friends recommendation is the most important
aspect. In a condent moodyou switch the order of the rst and last property: you prefer
to rely on your own judgement and the last thing you look at is friendsrecommendations.
So in a trusting mood the sh dish, which has been recommended by a friend, is
selected over the pizza, which has not been recommended. And the sh is also selected,
in a condent mood, over the pasta, because the latter is less appealing.
15Bernheim and Rangel [6] similar framework of choice with ancillary conditionsalso allows choice to
depend on information beyond the feasible set, although they do not focus explicitly on the properties of
C. Below we explore the relationship with Salant and Rubinsteins [43] in more detail.
16This property is also known as property  (see Sen [44]).
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However both pizza and pasta are cheaper than sh. When all three dishes are on
the menu, you are never observed to select sh (in violation of Expansion and Property
). The reason is that when you are condent, sh and pasta, which have both been
recommended, survive the rst elimination round and then pasta is selected on the grounds
of cheapness. And when you are trusting, sh and pizza, which are both appealing, are
shortlisted, to nally select pizza on the ground of cheapness. Formally:
Remark 1 C does not satisfy Expansion or Property . Let   = fP;Q;Rg, M =
f<m; <ng, P <m Q <m R and R <n Q <n P . Suppose P = fx; zg, Q = fy; zg and
R = fx; yg. Then
c (fx; yg ; <m) = fxg
c (fx; zg ; <m) = fzg
c (fx; yg ; <n) = fyg
c (fx; zg ; <n) = fxg
and therefore
C (fx; yg) = fx; yg
C (fx; zg) = fx; zg
But
c (fx; y; zg ; <m) = fzg
c (fx; y; zg ; <n) = fyg
so that
C (fx; y; zg) = fy; zg
We conclude that C violates both Expansion and Property .
Obviously, since Togetherness is weaker than Property , the example also shows that,
unlike in the model of menu-induced mood, C fails Togetherness.
Finally, the example also constitutes a violation of a more recent property introduced
by Eliaz and Ok [11], the Weak Axiom of Revealed Non-Inferiority:
WARNI: If for all y 2 A there exists B 2  such that x 2 C (B) and y 2 B, then
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x 2 C (A).
Eliaz and Ok interpret the fact that x 2 C (B) and y 2 B as revealing the non-
inferiority of x compared to y (though not necessarily its superiority). This suits a situa-
tion in which an agent may be undecided, rather than indi¤erent, between two alternatives
(in which case he cannot rank them). WARNI expresses a type of consistency that an
undecided agent might satisfy: an alternative which is revealed non-inferior to any other
alternative in a set should be chosen in that set. Therefore we conclude that some changes
of mood are incompatible with such a form of consistent indecisiveness.
4.2 Consistency of moody behaviour
We now show that environmental moody behaviour is nonetheless subject to strong re-
strictions. We begin from another classical property of choice:17
Property : If A  B then c (B) \ A  c (A).
Property  says that if x is chosen (in some mood) from a large set, then it is chosen (in
some mood) from a smaller set in which it is available. As we shall see, if C is generated
by environmental moods, it must satisfy Property . Intuitively, if in some mood you
pick steamed salmon from a menu, it means that in that mood steamed salmon fullls
some crucial property which the other alternatives do not fulll, and this will continue to
be the case even in subsets of that menu.
Property  is however not su¢ cient to characterize C, as the following example illus-
trates.
Example 8 Suppose C (fa; b; cg) = fag and C (fa; b; dg) = fa; bg. Although these two
choices do not violate Property , it is not possible to nd a mindset  , a set of moods
M and a choice function c such that
C (A) =
[
<m2M
c (A;<m)
To see this, suppose to the contrary that b 2 c (fa; b; dg ; <m) for some m 2 M . Since
b =2 C (fa; b; cg), it must be that there is an alternative i 2 fa; b; cg such that i 2 Pi, b =2 Pi
and b 2 Pj ) i 2 Pj for all Pj such that Pj <m Pi. If i = a, then it could not be that
b 2 c (fa; b; dg ; <m); while if i = c, then either a =2 c (fa; b; dg ; <m), or it must be that
c 2 C (fa; b; cg). In either case we have a contradiction.
17See Sen [44].
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4.2.1 Moody WARP
The above example leads us to a signicantly stronger condition that must be fullled by
a C generated by environmental moods:
Moody WARP: x =2 C (A) ; C (A)  B ) x =2 C (B).
Moody WARP says that if an alternative is rejected from a set A, it is rejected from
any other set that contains all the alternatives chosen in A. For example, if you were
observed to choose sometimes steamed seabass and sometimes the vegetarian option, but
never steamed salmon, from a menu, then you will not choose steamed salmon from
any new menu that includes both steamed seabass and the vegetarian option. If your
behaviour is determined by a variable checklist, it is easy to understand why this must
be the case. Whatever mood you are in, your choices from the old menu reveal that
the rst property that discerns between steamed salmon and steamed seabass (resp., the
vegetarian option) is such that steamed seabass (resp., the vegetarian option) has it while
steamed salmon lacks it.
Observe how WARP strengthens Moody WARP simply by replacing the entire choice
set C (A) with any alternative contained in it.
Observe also that Moody WARP implies Property .18
In the formal parts that follow we will nd it convenient to write Moody WARP in an
equivalent way (we leave the proof of equivalence as an easy exercise for the reader):
Moody WARP (restated): C (A)  B ) C (B) \ A  C (A).19
This perhaps less intuitive restatement requires that whenever what is chosen in a
new choice situation (A) was also available in an old choice situation (B), then the old
chosen alternatives which are still available remain chosen. Or, equivalently, that if some
previously chosen alternative is rejected in a new choice situation, there must exist some
previously unavailable alternative which is now chosen. For example, if before a change of
menu you sometimes chose steamed salmon but you dont pick it any more from the new
menu which includes it, there must exist some new item in the new menu (e.g. steamed
seabass) that you now sometimes choose. The logic being that while in the old menu
steamed salmon fullled some mood-related important property (e.g. lightness), the new
18Moody WARP implies x 2 C (B) ; C (A)  B ) x 2 C (A). Since A  B C (A)  B is implied by
A  B, Property  holds.
19A small choice theoretic observation: this formulation makes it clear that Moody WARP is a stronger
version of the classic axiom by Aizerman (see Aizerman and Malishevski [1]), which adds to the premise
in Moody WARP the requirement that the sets A and B are nested, i.e. B  A.
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item now fullls, in the same mood, an even more important property (e.g. lightness and
low fat content). If there werent an appealing new item such as steamed seabass, in the
relevant mood you should still be willing to pick salmon.
Proposition 5 C satises Moody WARP.
Proof. As a preliminary, we say that x m tops y, written xTmy, if there is a mood
<m and a property Pi such that x 2 Pi, y =2 Pi and y 2 Pj ) x 2 Pj for all Pj such that
Pj <m Pi. Observe that for all D 2  and <m2 M , x 2 c (D;<m) only if there is no
y 2 D such that yTmx.
The statement of the proposition is trivially true if B \ c (A;<m) = ? for all <m2M ,
so suppose that B \ c (A;<m) 6= ? for some <m2M . Then
B \ C (A) = B \
[
<m2M
c (A;<m)
=
[
<m2M
B \ c (A;<m) 
[
<m2M
c (B;<m)
= C (B)
where the inclusion is proved with the following reasoning. Since C (B)  A, for all
<m2 M we have c (B;<m)  A. So in particular there is no y 2 BnA that m tops
any x 2 c (B;<m). Therefore for all x 2 c (A;<m) \ B we also have x 2 c (B;<m)
(if not, there would exist y 2 BnA with yTmx). We conclude that, for all <m2 M ,
c (A;<m) \B  c (B;<m), from which the desired inclusion follows.
Mood swings thus allow observed choice to exhibit a signicant degree of consistency,
in the form of the Moody WARP property. A violation of Moody WARP informs us that
the agents choices cannot be explained by preference maximisation plus mood. This
result is very general in that it holds on any arbitrary domain of choice. While we have
been unable to obtain a result of similar absolute generality in the other direction, we can
nevertheless show that Moody WARP does fully characterise moody choice in a leading
case.
Theorem 2 Suppose that the domain  consists of all the nonempty subsets of a nite
set X:Then a choice function C has a variable checklist with environmental moods if and
only if C satises Moody WARP.
Proof: In view of proposition 5, we only need to prove one direction. Let Moody WARP
hold. We construct a variable checklist explicitly, then show that it retrieves C (A) for
each set A 2 . Let   = fxgx2X	, and let jXj = n.
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An a path is a sequence a = fxigi=1;:::n of distinct alternatives x1; x2; :::xn dened
recursively as follows. x1 2 C (X) and, for all i > 1, xi 2 C (Xn fx1; :::; xi 1g). Denote
by  the collection of a paths. Construct M by setting, for each a 2 :
fxig <a fxjg if and only if i < j and xi; xj 2 a
We now show that this construction retrieves choice.
Fix an arbitrary set A 2 , let x 2 C (A), and suppose by contradiction that for
each <m2 M , there is an alternative w such that fwg <m fxg. For each <m let fymg
denote the <m  maximal property in A, that is fymg <m fzg for all z 2 An fymg. By
construction we have that ym 2 c (Am; <m) where Am = fz 2 X : ym <m zg. Observe
that by assumption there is no <m such that x =2 c (Am; <m) (otherwise fxg would be
maximal in A for some mood). Moreover, by construction it must also be that A  Am,
for otherwise it would not be true that fymg <m fzg for all z 2 An fymg. If for any
of the Am it is the case that C (Am)  A, then by Moody WARP it would follow that
C (A)\Am  C (Am), contradicting x =2 c (Am; <m). So suppose not, so that C (Am) nA 6=
?, and consider Am1 = Amn fz1g where z1 2 C (Am) nA. As before, either C (Am1)  A,
so that the contradiction C (A) \ Am1  C (Am1) follows; or C (Am1) nA 6= ?. More in
general, proceed recursively setting Amj = Amj 1n fzjg where zj 2 C (Amj) nA whenever
C (Amj) nA 6= ? and j > 1. At each step either C (Amj)  A, implying C (A) \ Amj 
C (Amj); orC (Amj) nA 6= ?. SinceX is nite there exists a j such that C (Amj) nA = ?,
generating the desired contradiction.
Suppose now that x 2 AnC (A), and that in contradiction there exists some mood
<m2 M such that x 2 c (A;<m). By construction it must be that y 2 C (B) where B =
fy 2 X : fxg <m fygg, and that A  B. If A = B we have an immediate contradiction.
If instead A  B, then C (A)  B, so that by Moody WARP C (B) \ A  C (A) also
follows, implying x 2 C (A), a contradiction.
4.2.2 Environmental moods produce behaviour that looks like rational be-
haviour with errors
We now proceed to illustrate another interesting feature of moody behaviour. As it turns
out, to an observer of choices and not of moods, moody behaviour can always appear as
the outcome of occasional departures, attributable to mistakes, from ordinary preference
maximisation.
An error function is a correspondence e :  ! 2X , with e(A)  A for all A 2 .
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An error function is monotonic if B  A implies e(A) \ B  e (B). With a monotonic
error function, the alternatives that can be chosen by mistake in a large set can also be
chosen by mistake in a small set. Popular models of choice error have this feature. For
example, in the Random Utility Model (culminated in McFaddens ([32], [33]) conditional
logit or multinomial logit discrete choice model)20 suppose that the agent maximises a
utility function u but that the utility is subject to an alternative-dependent random shock,
so that the utility of x is a random variable u (x) + ~" (x). Interpret x 2 e (A) as x not
maximizing u over A, but u (x) + " (x)  u (y) + " (y) for all y 2 A for some realizations
" (x) and " (y) of the errors associated with x and y, respectively. Then clearly the same
realizations yield u (x) + " (x)  u (y) + " (y) for all y 2 B  A, so that x 2 e (B).
The inequality condition in the statement below ensures that the error cannot trivially
explain the entire choice: the set of preference maximisers must be nonempty for each
choice set.
Proposition 6 (Maximisation-plus-error interpretation). There exists a preference %
and a monotonic error function e such that for all A 2 
C(A) = fx : x % y for all y 2 Ag [ e (A)
and C (A) 6= e (A)
Proof: Fix any mood <m2M . By theorem 1 there exists a preference % such that, for all
A 2 , c (A;<m) = fx : x % y for all y 2 Ag. Then dene e by e (A) = C (A) nc (A;<m).
Since C (A) nc (A;<m) =
S
<n2Mnf<mg c (A;<n), the same arguments used before to show
that C satises Moody WARP, and therefore Property , prove that e has the desired
monotonicity property.
An interpretation of the arbitrary mood in the proof above can be that of a baseline
or coolmood: any departure from this cool mood, which generates a rational preference,
can be considered as an error by an external observer (and perhaps also by the agent).
With a view to welfare analysis, the cool mood choices should be considered welfare
revealing. It is clear, however, that choice data alone cannot be su¢ cient to identify the
cool mood. Auxiliary assumptions and observations would be necessary.21
20See also McFadden [34] for a historical perspective.
21This conclusion is in line with Koszegi and Rabins [19] penetrating general discussion of the extent
to which choice data are welfare revealing.
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4.3 Relationship with choice with frames
We can now make the relationship between this framework and Salant and Rubinstein
[43] choice with frame more precise. As we observed in section 4.1, the choice function
c (:; <m) can be seen as a special type of choice with frame, where each mood <m plays
the role of a particular frame. Of course, in our framework a mood is a well order of
the properties, rather than of single alternatives. Nevertheless, in view of theorem 1, to
each <m we can associate a weak order on the set of alternatives. When the weak order
is a strict linear order, such a substitution generates a choice function that Salant and
Rubinstein term choice by salient consideration (a single-valued choice function that
maximises some frame dependent strict linear order on the alternatives). In the proof of
theorem 2 we have however implicitly proved that a C with a variable checklist can always
be seen (on the domain of statement) as the union of single-valued choice functions. In
short, then, we can establish an equivalence between the choice correspondence induced
by a choice by salient consideration as frames vary, and the choice correspondence C
induced by c (:; <m) as moods vary. The upshot is that, as a by-product, theorem 2 also
provides a characterization of choice correspondences generated by salient consideration
choice functions.
5 Extensions
So far we have considered checklists that by themselves produce rational behaviour. Mood
(variability of the checklist) is the only factor that caused departures from preference
maximization. But the method we have used can be generalized to incorporate aspects
of bounded rationality distinct from the e¤ects of mood. IN particular, we can relax the
precisionof a checklist. In a checklist the decision maker is always able to tell whether or
not an alternative has or lacks a given property: but what if his power of discrimination
is more opaque? In a checklist, for any given property, an alternative is either inor
out, so that a property either couples or uncouples any two distinct alternatives: a
lottery is either riskless or risky, a house is either a¤ordable or not for a given budget,
a candidate is either qualied for a job or he is not, and so on. Operationally, we can
associate to each alternative an index function that takes value 1 for each property that the
alternative possesses, and 0 otherwise. Nevertheless one can conceive of many instances
where this manichaean distinction might be unreasonable, specically those cases where
an alternative may possess a given property to a degree - a food item might not just
either bowl you over or disgust you, but just be passable; a painkiller might not be just
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either completely e¤ective or completely ine¤ective, but also somewhat e¤ective, and so
on. In this cases a modeler would like to be able to distinguish whether a given alternative
denitely possesses, or denitely does not possess, or possesses to some degree a given
property. Operationally this can be done by coding each alternative with either 1, 0 or
 1 for denitely has, somewhat asand denitely does not havethe given property.22
Formally, this makes of each property a semiorder.23 A semiorder is simply a binary
relation B that ranks any two alternatives only if they are denitelyapart; in particular,
B can be represented by a function f and a parameter  such that xBy if and only if
f (x) > f (y) + . In words, x is declared superior than y whenever the f -attribute value
of x exceeds the f -attribute value of y by a di¤erence which is at least  - in all other
cases the two alternatives are not su¢ ciently distant, in utility terms, to be told apart.
Going back to three valued properties, we can view each property as a function f
assigning value 0, 1 or  1 to each alternative. Setting  = 1 we have that two alternatives
x and y can be distinguished by a property P only if the property assigns value 1 to one
alternative and  1 to the other. This is the approach we have followed in Manzini and
Mariotti [29], where however, as in the original checklist model, the order of application of
the properties is xed. A natural extension would be to x the mindset as the collection
of (three valued) properties, and let the order in which they are considered depend on
mood.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have distinguished between the mindset of an agent, which expresses the
stable component of his psychology and is identied by the characteristics he cares for
in choice alternatives; and his mood, assuming that it manifests itself as the urgency the
agent attaches to these characteristics. The mood may depend on the choice set, or it
may vary exogenously, with choice from the same set observed under di¤erent moods.
Our framework shows that mood swings in the presence of a stable mindset give rise
to regularities in choice behaviour, generating their testable implications on choice data.
These implications are simple modications of classical revealed preference conditions.
In practice, mood is not entirely unpredictable: psychological research may help to
22This point can be generalised still further to consider properties that admit an arbitrary number of
degrees, or discrimination. This is an alternative interpretation of Manzini and Mariotti [28]. See also
Apesteguia and Ballester [3].
23More precisely, a semiorder is a binary relation P onXthat is irreexive (i.e. for all x 2 X, (x; x) =2 P .)
and which satises (i) (x; y) ; (w; z) 2 P imply (x; z) 2 P or (w; y) 2 P ; (ii) (x; y) 2 P and (y; z) 2 P
imply (x;w) 2 P or (w; z) 2 P . See Luce [25].
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identify correlations between environmental and personal variables with mood, and mood
with choice, so that additional elements of predictability in choice can be identied. Our
contribution has been to identify what can be predicted exclusively in terms of an economic
choice model.
While mood a¤ects choice, it is also true that choice a¤ects mood: as we saw, which
movie you choose to watch after surgery is going to have an e¤ect on how much painkillers
you will ask for. In general, there is a subtle two-way interaction between psychological
states and choices. While at the moment it is not clear how this interaction can be mod-
elled, some progress has been made by Dalton and Ghosal [10] who resolve the interaction
through an elegant equilibrium analysis. Our paper is just a rst step towards the formal
modelling of moody choice behaviour.
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